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searched prior to the arrest is not a de 
minimis intrusion that may be ignored. 
[d. at 1098. The Court held that incident 
to the arrest, an officer, without probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion, could 
search places immediately adjoining the 
area of arrest from which an attack could 
be launched. [d. Beyond that, however, 
"there must be articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational infer-
ences from these facts, would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer in believing 
that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger ... " [d. 
In so holding, the Court emphasized 
the limited scope of a protective sweep; 
that is, it should be confined to a cursory 
visual inspection, not a full search, of 
areas where a person may be found. It 
may last as long as is necessary to relieve 
the suspicion of danger but no longer 
than is necessary for the arrest and depar-
ture. [d. at 1099. 
Moreover, the Court maintained that 
its holding did not conflict with Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Buie, 
110 S. Ct. at 1099. The Chimel Court held 
that a warrantless but justifiable search 
incident to an in-home arrest was limited 
to the arrestee's person and the area from 
which he could obtain a weapon. The 
Court distinguished Chimel in two ways: 
1) it was concerned with preventing a 
full blown search of a house for evidence 
unrelated to the arrest, unlike the more 
limited intrusion of a protective sweep; 
and 2) the justification for the search was 
the threat posed by the arrestee, not by 
unseen third parties. [d. 
Relying on Terry and Long, the Su-
preme Court held that warrantless pro-
tective sweeps of private dwellings 
during an arrest are to be measured by a 
reasonable articulable suspicion stan-
dard. By relaxing the general rule requir-
ing probable cause, abuse of police 
discretion in determining the necessity 
and scope of a protective sweep may 
result. However, the Court has yet to 
recognize the validity of such speculative 
concerns. 
-Tena Touzos 
City of Annapolis v. United Food & 
Commercial Worker~ Local 400: 
DRUG TFSTING OF CITY POIlCE 
AND FIRE FIGIITERS WAS Nor AN 
UNCONS1mJfIONAL SFARCH AND 
SEIZURE WHEN CONDUCfED DUR-
ING A REGUlARLY-SCHEDULED 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 
Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989), the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of 
police and flfe fighters did not violate the 
fourth amendment. The court of appeals 
reasoned that the police and flfe fighters' 
privacy interests were outweighed by 
the City's compelling interest in the 
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the 
public. [d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. Thus, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's ruling. 
In September of 1986, the City of An-
napolis proposed to the unions a drug 
testing plan, which required police and 
fire fighters, as part of their regularly-
scheduled periodic physical examina-
tions, to submit urine samples to ascer-
tain the presence of illegal drugs. Id. at 
546, 565 A.2d at 672-73. One year later, 
after the parties failed to reach an agree-
ment regarding the details of the pro-
gram, the City flied a complaint of unfair 
labor practices with the State Mediation 
and Conciliation Service. [d. The City 
alleged in its complaint that the unions 
failed to negotiate in good faith. [d. The 
State Mediation and Conciliation Service 
found that the drug testing program was 
not unconstitutional as an unreasonable 
search and seizure and allowed the City 
to implement its program. The unions, 
seeking to prevent implementation of 
the program, appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County. Id. at 
54748, 565 A.2d at 673-74. The circuit 
court found that the plan was unconsti-
tutional under the fourth amendment, 
because it was not based on individual-
ized suspicion of drug use among the 
employees. [d. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674. 
The lower court then issued a writ of 
mandamus enjoining the city from imple-
menting its program. [d. at 550, 565 A.2d 
at 675. The City appealed the circuit 
court's decision, and the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted certiorari prior 
to consideration by the court of special 
appeals. [d. 
In reaching its decision, the court of 
appeals relied primarily on two recent 
Supreme Court cases that were decided 
after the lower court's ruling. In the first 
case, National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 
(1989), the Court upheld mandatory sus-
picionless drug testing of Customs Serv-
ice employees involved in drug 
interdiction or who carried a firearm. 
United Food, 317 Md. at 551, 565 A.2d 
at 675. In the second case, Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. 
Ct. 1402 (1989), the Court approved Fed-
eral Railroad Administration regulations 
that mandated testing of blood and urine 
samples for drug use by employees fol-
lowing major train accidents. United 
Food, 317 Md. at 551,565 A.2d at 675. 
Both Skinner and Von Raab held that 
the collection and testing of urine was a 
"search" and implicated the proctection 
of the fourth amendment. Id. (citing 
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; Von Raab, 
109 S. Ct. at 1390). However, in Skinner, 
the Supreme Court stated that "where 
the privacy interests implicated by the 
search are minimal, and where an impor-
tant governmental interest furthered by 
the intrusion would be placed in jeop-
ardy by a requirement of individualized 
suspicion, a search may be reasonable 
despite the absence of such suspicion." 
[d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (quoting Skin-
ner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417). 
In applying the Supreme Court hold-
ings of Skinner and Von Raab to United 
Food, the court of appeals focused on the 
degree of intrusiveness of the "actual" 
assaying of the urine sample for drug use, 
instead of the mandatory taking of the 
sample. [d. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676. The 
court reasoned that the employees had 
already been providing samples for anal-
ysis as part of their regularly-scheduled 
physical examinations. [d. Recognizing 
that the actual assaying of samples for 
drug use constituted a search, the court 
in United Food found that the instrusion 
on employees' reasonable expectation of 
privacy was not only "minimal" under 
Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible 
for four reasons. Id. 
First, the employees in United Food 
received three distinct notices of testing: 
(1) that the physical would be during 
their "birthday" month; (2) within thirty 
days, they knew the week of the exami-
nation; and (3) within forty-eight hours, 
they knew the time ofthe physical. [d. at 
554, 565 A.2d at 67&77. Second, the 
disclosure of "private facts," including 
evidence of physical infirmities or latent 
diseases, was already part of the regular 
physical examination. [d. at 554-55, 565 
A.2d at 677. Therefore, no reasonable 
expectation of privacy existed with re-
gard to the disclosure of private facts. [d. 
Third, employees were required to com-
plete a medication form to determine 
whether a positive test could have re-
sulted from an employee's lawful use of 
drugs. [d. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (em-
phasis added). Although certain private 
medical facts might be disclosed on the 
medication form, the same facts would 
be the subject of inquiry during a routine 
physical examination. [d. Thus, comple-
tion of the medication form was not a 
significant invasion of privacy. Fourth, 
regular physical examinations were used 
to promote physical fitness and treat em-
ployees with drug abuse problems. [d. at 
555-56,565 A.2d at 677-78. 
The court of appeals next considered 
the governmental interests advanced by 
the drug tests. In Von Raab, the Supreme 
Court identified two govermental inter-
ests of a compelling nature which sup-
ported drug tests for certain Customs 
Service employees as "ensuring that 
front-line interdiction personnel are 
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physically fIt, and have unimpeachable 
integrity and judgment." Id. at 561-62, 
565 A.2d at 680 (quoting Von Raab, 109 
S. Ct. at 1393). Likewise, drug use by 
employees required to carry fIrearms 
wowd jeopardize public safety. Id. The 
court of appeals compared the work of 
the customs' officers with that of police 
and fire fIghters and found the City to 
have similar governmental interests. Id. 
at 562-63, 565 A.2d at 681. The court 
noted that the police are also involved in 
front-line drug interdiction within their 
jurisdiction and are permitted to carry 
firearms whether on duty or off. Id. In 
addition, fire fIghters are "charged with 
duties to repond quickly and effectively 
at a moment's notice," and their actions 
have implications on the life and prop-
erty of others. Id. Thus, the court of 
appeals held that the City's interest in the 
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the 
public outweighed the privacy interests 
of the police and fire fIghters. Id. at 566, 
565 A.2d at 683. 
Finally, the court of appeals held that 
since there was not a great privacy ex-
pectation in the drug analysis of an 
employee's urine produced in regular 
examinations, reqUiring a warrant would 
add little protection to the individual's 
privacy. Id. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681. 
The purpose of a warrant is to protect the 
privacy interests by assuring citizens sub-
ject to a search or seizure that such intru-
sions are not the random or arbitrary acts 
of the government. Id. The court of ap-
peals concluded that the warrant pur-
poses were not jeopardized in United 
Food because the City's program re-
quired suspicionless drug testing in the 
context of an employee's physical exam-
ination.Id. at 564, 565 A.2d at 682. Con-
sequently, the City did not exercise 
discretion in determining when an em-
ployee would be tested for drugs. Id. 
By its decision in United Food, the 
court of appeals has adopted the prevail-
ing law set fOlth by the Supreme Court 
in its decisions in Skinner and Von Raab. 
Moreover, the court has broadened the 
suspicionless search exception to the 
fourth amendment to include drug test-
ing of police and fire fighters when con-
ducted during annual physical 
examinations. 
-Ellen W. Cohill 
SL Luke Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, Inc. v. Smith: REASONABLE 
AITORNEY'S FEFS MAY BE 
CONSIDERED BY TIIEJURYWHEN 
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in a 
4-3 decision held that attorney's fees of a 
prevailing party may now be considered 
by a jury in determining an award of 
punitive damages. st. Luke Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 
337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990). The court's 
holding represents a departure from the 
American rule requiring each party to a 
lawsuit provide for his or her own costs 
of litigation. 
Ginny Ann Smith sought compensa-
tory and punitive damages from David 
Buchenroth, a pastor at St. Luke Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church (St. Luke's). She 
alleged he defamed her character and 
invaded her privacy when he knowingly, 
or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
communicated false statements to 
church members about her sexual in-
volvement with a married church offi-
cial. Ms. Smith joined St. Luke's as a 
defendant on the theory that by dismiss-
ing her from her job it had ratlied the 
injurious statements of its agent, Pastor 
Buchenroth. 
At trial, the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County permitted Ms. Smith to pre-
sent evidence of the amount of her 
attorney's fees on the issue of punitive 
damages. The jury found in her favor and 
awarded her compensatory and punitive 
damages against both Pastor Buchenroth 
and St. Luke's. 
The court of special appeals reversed, 
holding that during jury selection Ms. 
Smith was erroneously allowed twice the 
number of peremptory strikes permitted. 
Ms. Smith sought review of the decision 
in the court of appeals. St. Luke's cross-
petitioned, contending that the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to con-
sider Ms. Smith's attorney's fees in its 
award of punitive damages. Both peti-
tions were granted. 
The peremptory strike ruling was 
overturned by the court which held that 
even if error had been committed the 
error was harmless. It then focused on 
the principal issue of the case - whether 
attorney's fees may be considered in de-
termining punitive damages. 
To begin its analYSiS, the court review-
ed the English rule which awards the 
costs of litigation to the prevailing party. 
St. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 344, 568 
A.2d at 38. The rule pre-dates the time of 
King Henry VIII and continues to be ap-
plied in English courts today. Id. at 344-
45, 568 A.2d at 38 (citing C. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law o/Damages 234, 
235 (1935)). 
Following its declaration of indepen-
dence, America began a move away from 
the English rule. Statutes fIxing the 
amount of attorney's fees recoverable by 
a successful party gave way to attorney 
fee schedules established by a free mar-
ket. In the American system of jurispru-
dence the notion that each litigant to a 
dispute should provide for his or her own 
costs of litigation evolved. There have 
been some exceptions; as where parties 
to a contract agree, in the event of litiga-
tion, the loser will bear all legal expenses, 
or where a statute allows an aggrieved 
party to recover attorney's fees. Id. at 
345-47, 568 A.2d at 39. 
After examining Maryland Rwe 1-341, 
wherein attorney's fees are imposed 
upon a party acting in bad faith, the court 
stated, "[ilt is reasonable, therefore, to 
conclude that in this state, an award of 
attorney's fees serves, in general, as a 
legislative tool for punishing wrongful 
conduct." Id. at 347, 568 A.2d at 39. The 
court drew a nexus between attorney's 
fees imposed by statute and an award of 
punitive damages in a court proceeding. 
Both, the court observed, have as a main 
goal the punishment of wrongful con-
duct.Id. at 347,568 A.2d at 40. 
Despite the court's espousal of the 
American rule in Empire Realty Co. v. 
Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 305 A.2d 144 
(1973), the court distinguished the case 
explaining that punitive damages were 
not at issue and thus it had declined to 
decide whether fee shifting was appro-
priate in a punitive damages case. St. 
Luke Church, 318 Md. at 348,568 A.2d 
at 40. The court, however, did agree with 
the prevailing view that attorney's fees 
not be considered when awarding com-
pensatory damages in an attempt to make 
the successful claimant whole. The court 
said that where a party's wrongful con-
duct warrants the imposition of punitive 
damages, the remedy is appropriate. It 
found support for the premise in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914 and 
comment a (1979). St. Luke Church, 318 
Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 4l. 
The court next noted, of the seventeen 
states having considered the issue, nine 
have adopted the view that in cases 
where punitive damages are properly at 
issue, the costs of litigation may be con-
sidered in the measurement of an award. 
Id. at 349-50, 568 A.2d at 41. States de-
clining to follow this view contend that 
this form of remedy is entirely compen-
satory in nature, and not a valid means of 
computing punitive damages. They also 
contend that it improperly impinges 
upon the jury's discretionary power to 
fIx the amount of punitive damages. Id. 
at 350, 568 A.2d at 41. 
In response, the court of appeals 
stated: 
It is true that an award of attorney's 
fees reimburses a plaintiff for his 
out-of-pocket legal expenses. When 
viewed solely in this light such fees 
may seem to be wholly compensa-
tory in function. Yet, when viewed 
in the context of the long-standing 
prohibition against awarding 
attorney's fees, and the fact that 
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